Abstract-Current fault attacks against public key cryptography focus on traditional schemes, such as RSA and ECC, and, to a lesser extent, on primitives such as XTR. However, bilinear maps, or pairings, have presented theorists with a new and increasingly popular way of constructing cryptographic protocols. Most notably, this has resulted in efficient methods for Identity Based Encryption (IBE). Since identity-based cryptography seems an ideal partner for identity aware devices such as smart-cards, in this paper, we examine the security of concrete pairing instantiations in terms of fault attack.
INTRODUCTION
T HE increasing ubiquity of computing devices is continuing to offer exciting new applications to consumers, but also multiplies the number of security issues a system designer must consider. Since such devices will be carried into and used in hostile environments and often house sensitive information, for example, identity-related tokens or financial information, the threat of attack is significant. This threat is magnified by both the potential pay-off and the level of anonymity that side-channel attacks allow.
Side-channel analysis, formally proposed by Kocher et al. [12] , [13] , is the art of externally monitoring a device while it executes some algorithm that includes secret information. We can extend this passive definition of sidechannel attack to include active, fault injection attacks [1] , [2] whereby an attacker can physically manipulate the target device, tamper with the internal state, and perform erroneous operations. Although attack and defense techniques in this context are increasingly well understood, the current emphasis in terms of public key systems is mainly on traditional cryptographic schemes such as RSA and ECC. For example, in ECC-based systems, one generally derives security from a discrete logarithm problem posed over the curve group. That is, one constructs some private value d and performs the operation Q ¼ d Á P for a public point P . For large enough curve groups, reversal of this operation is intractable and, hence, one can transmit Q without revealing d. A multitude of side-channel and fault attacks against implementations of this primitive have been proposed. An equally large range of innovative countermeasures mean that, when correctly implemented, the threats can generally be at least managed and possibly nullified.
There has been no previous work on the security of pairing-based cryptography [9] in the context of sidechannel and fault attack. Since pairings, formally described as bilinear maps, underpin cryptographic protocols such as Identity Based Encryption (IBE) [5] , one might see them as an ideal application for the same identity-aware, ubiquitous computing devices that are vulnerable to attacks of this type. One reason for this lack of analysis is the fact that early implementation techniques for computing the Tate pairing, such as the BKLS algorithm [4] , are effectively realized as a point multiplication with a fixed multiplier and some auxiliary operations to compute the pairing value. From such a description, the fact that the algorithm performs a fixed sequence of operations and has no secret in a conventional sense has led people to believe that the pairing is secure against current side-channel and fault attack methods. In part, this is true. However, the role of the pairing in associated protocols is somewhat different and much more diverse than point multiplication in ECC: It isn't enough to consider the new primitive in the context of traditional attack methods.
In an attempt to bridge the resulting gap, in this paper, we present an investigation of pairing evaluation algorithms that are based on a closed algebraic expression, in terms of their security against fault attack. We organize our work by first presenting a brief introduction to pairings and algorithms for their evaluation in Section 2. We then investigate applications of active, fault injection attacks against the Duursma-Lee algorithm and its extensions by Kwon and Barreto et al. in Section 3. In Section 4, we present efficient countermeasures and, finally, we end with some concluding remarks in Section 5.
AN INTRODUCTION TO PAIRINGS
Let E be an elliptic curve over a finite field IF q and let O denote the identity element of the associated group of rational points EðIF q Þ. For a positive integer lj#EðIF q Þ coprime to q, let IF q k be the smallest extension field of IF q which contains the lth roots of unity in IF q . The extension degree k is called the security multiplier. Let EðIF q Þ½l denote the subgroup of EðIF q Þ of all points of order dividing l and similarly for the degree k extension of IF q . To unify the notation used in most protocols, we use three groups, G 1 , G 2 , and G 3 . The groups G 1 and G 2 will always be subgroups of elliptic curve groups, whereas the group G 3 is a subgroup of the multiplicative group of a finite field.
The Reduced Tate Pairing
For a thorough treatment of the following, we refer the reader to [4] and also [10] and to [16] for an introduction to divisors. The Tate pairing of order l is the map
given by e l ðP ; QÞ ¼ f P ;l ðDÞ. Here, f P ;l is a function on E whose divisor is equivalent to lðP Þ À lðOÞ, D is a divisor equivalent to ðQÞ À ðOÞ whose support is disjoint from the support of f P ;l , and f P ;l ðDÞ ¼ . It is efficiently computable. The nondegeneracy condition requires that Q is not a multiple of P , i.e., that Q is in some order l subgroup of EðIF q k Þ disjoint from EðIF q Þ½l. When one computes f P ;l ðDÞ, the value obtained belongs to the quotient group IF q k given by this exponentiation makes it possible to compute f P ;l ðQÞ rather than f P ;l ðDÞ. In fact, we can consider the reduced Tate pairing as a pairing of the groups
, the group of lth roots of unity.
The Tate Pairing on Supersingular Curves
From its very definition, it is clear that the Tate pairing can only be computed efficiently if the security multiplier k is small. Since, by definition, k is the order of q in IF Ã l , it will, for a general curve, be the size of l. Therefore, the first curves to be used in pairing-based cryptography were supersingular curves since their security multiplier satisfies k 6. The maximum k ¼ 6 is only attained in characteristic 3, whereas, for fields of characteristic 2, we have k 4 and k 2 otherwise. More recently, Miyaji et al. [15] (MNT) devised a method to construct ordinary elliptic curves over large prime fields with security multiplier k 6. The two main differences between ordinary and supersingular curves from a pairing perspective are as follows:
. Supersingular curves admit a distortion map, i.e., a nonrational endomorphism : EðIF q Þ ! EðIF q k Þ.
The advantage of this distortion map is that it allows us to define a nontrivial pairing on EðIF q Þ½l: Let P ¼ ðx 1 ; y 1 Þ and Q ¼ ðx 2 ; y 2 Þ be elements of EðIF q Þ½l, then the modified Tate pairing on EðIF q Þ½l is the mapping f P ððQÞÞ. Note that the image ðQÞ 6 2 EðIF q Þ½l and, thus, it is linearly independent of P . . There are known closed algebraic expressions for the modified Tate pairing on supersingular curves in characteristics 2 and 3. This not only enables very efficient implementations, but also makes the algorithms more vulnerable to fault attacks, as we will show. In the remainder of this paper, we will only consider supersingular curves in characteristics 2 and 3.
For IF q with q ¼ 3 m , the supersingular curves used in cryptography are defined by an equation of the form E : Duursma and Lee introduced a specialized algorithm [7] to compute pairings on a family of hyperelliptic curves, including the aforementioned supersingular curves in characteristic 3. The performance of their method was improved upon slightly by Kwon [8] by exchanging 2 cube roots for 8 cube operations and by Barreto et al. [3] who introduced the and T pairings. The Duursma-Lee method is shown in Algorithm 1; note that the final result is powered by q 3 À 1 to form a compatible result with the BKLS algorithm [4] .
In the case of q ¼ 2 m with m odd, the supersingular curves with k ¼ 4 are given by equations of the form E : The Duursma-Lee algorithm was independently extended to characteristic 2 by Kwon [8] and improved substantially by Barreto et al. [3] using the and T approach. A careful comparison of the pairing with Kwon's algorithm shows that they are in fact identical up to a slight rearrangement of terms; the Kwon-BGOS method is given in Algorithm 2. Note that the final result is powered by q 2 À 1 to be compatible with the BKLS algorithm. Finally, we mention that the fault attack described in Section 3 also applies with minor modifications to the T pairing and that an alternative implementation of the above algorithms might precompute the cube roots and square roots, which could possibly lead to other interesting vulnerabilities.
Algorithm 2 The Kwon-BGOS algorithm
3 ATTACKING THE PAIRING 3.1 A Faulty Duursma-Lee Algorithm 3.
Recovering a Secret Point
Given the secret point P ¼ ðx 1 ; y 1 Þ and Q ¼ ðx 2 ; y 2 Þ, a point chosen by the attacker, assume for the moment that we can eliminate the final powering. Let e Á denote pairing via the Duursma-Lee algorithm, where, through tampering, we induce some transient fault and replace the loop bound m with Á. This could be achieved by using a glitch attack [1] , [14] to tamper with the loop test and branch mechanism or, given that the Duursma-Lee algorithm is essentially parameterized by m given the right field arithmetic and that m is therefore likely to be held in memory somewhere, by selectively provoking errors in memory or registers [2] , [17] . Given this ability, instead of producing a product of polynomials of the form
for some value Á and, remembering that for now, we ignore the final powering. If we were able to induce a fault so that Á ¼ m þ 1, for example, by glitching the loop iteration so it executes once too often, then recovering the secret point is trivial: We compute two pairings, one correct and one tampered with: If we use g ðiÞ to denote the ith factor of a product produced by the Duursma-Lee algorithm, by dividing the two results above, we are left with a single factor g ðmþ1Þ ¼ Ày
Since we have that z 3 m ¼ z for all elements z 2 IF q , we can extract x 1 or y 1 , given that we know x 2 and y 2 , and, hence, reconstruct the secret point. However, the ability to selectively induce a fault so Á ¼
The problem with this approach is detecting when we have induced faults with the correct Á values for use. This is also quite an easy task. Since the algorithm is straight-line and takes a fixed number of operations, given the time taken to compute the pairing or a power profile, it seems simple to work out how many loop iterations were performed in the same way that one can observe and count the 16 rounds of DES. Given the value of r, this approach will deterministically recover the correct value of P and requires reasonably few invocations of the pairing on the target device due to a similar argument as the birthday paradox: We simply keep provoking random faults until we recover a pair of results that satisfy our conditions.
Reversing the Final Powering
The remaining problem then is to reverse the final powering, which takes the output of the pairing function and produces a unique representative for the coset in IF
To reverse this operation given the result R ¼ eðP ; QÞ, we want to recover S, the value that was computed by the algorithm before the final powering so that R ¼ S 
all others are of the form c Á S for nonzero c 2 IF q 3 . However, given the attack description above, we are not trying to reverse the powering on the full product of factors computed by the Duursma-Lee algorithm, rather only one of these factors, which has a fairly special form. That is, given ðmAErþ1Þ ;
we want to recover g ðmAErþ1Þ , which will, in turn, allow us to recover the correct x 1 and y 1 for the secret point. We therefore need a method to compute one valid root of R ¼ g Since IF q 6 ffi IF q 3 ½=ð 2 À 1Þ, we can write X ¼ x 0 þ x 1 and R ¼ r 0 þ r 1 , with x 0 ; x 1 ; r 0 ; r 1 2 IF q 3 . Using this representation, we see that the above equation is equivalent to
The kernel of the matrix M is a one-dimensional vector space over IF q 3 and, thus, provides all the solutions to X q 3 À1 À R ¼ 0.
To choose the correct root among all q 3 À 1 possibilities, we use the specific form of the factors in the product computed in the Duursma-Lee algorithm. Indeed, each factor g is of the form
with g 0 ; g 1 ; g 2 2 IF q . To recover g from R ¼ g
, we first obtain g 0 ¼ c Á g for some c 2 IF q 3 using the root finding algorithm above and then compute c À1 and, thus, g itself. Again, this boils down to a simple linear system of equations: By multiplying g 0 with an appropriate factor in IF q 3 , we can assume that g 0 is of the form
we use the fact that the terms and 2 do not appear in g. This finally gives the following linear system of equations:
3.2 A Faulty Kwon-BGOS Algorithm
Recovering a Secret Point
The attack closely follows the attack described for the Duursma-Lee algorithm, the main difference being the exact form of the factors computed in Algorithm 2. Again assume we want to recover a secret point P ¼ ðx 1 ; y 1 Þ and have knowledge of the point Q ¼ ðx 2 ; y 2 Þ. By changing the loop bound to Á, the Kwon-BGOS algorithm now computes the following product:
. It is clear that if we are given one factor of the above product and the point Q, we can recover the secret point P since the coefficient of t gives x 1 and the constant coefficient gives y 1 .
Reversing the Final Powering
As for the Duursma-Lee algorithm, we can recover P if we are given the correct factor of the product; however, by running the faulty Kwon-BGOS algorithm, we actually get
ðmAErþ1Þ ;
which only determines g ðmAErþ1Þ up to a factor in IF Ã q 2 . Again, we proceed in two steps: First, we recover a random ðq 2 À 1Þth root of R and then exploit the structure of the factor g ðmAErþ1Þ to compensate for the random factor in IF
To find the correct root, we exploit the structure of g ðmAErþ1Þ ; taking into account that t 2 ¼ t þ s, g ðmAErþ1Þ is given by an expression of the form
for k ¼ m AE r þ 1. In particular, there is no st-term and the coefficient of t is 1. Assume we have computed the root g ¼ g 0 þ g 1 t, then the correct root is clearly given by g
COUNTERMEASURES
In this section, we investigate several types of countermeasures specifically tailored to pairing based cryptography.
Using New Point Blinding Techniques
As shown in the previous section, the attack on the pairing algorithms is only successful when the adversary has knowledge of one input point. Therefore, it is natural to utilize point blinding techniques to construct a defense mechanism. Such techniques apply a blinding factor to one or both of the input points before the pairing and eliminate this factor afterward. If we blind the point under the control of the attacker, any tampering with the pairing will cause the unblinding phase to essentially produce a random result. Since we know that the relationship eða Á P ; b Á QÞ ¼ eðP ; QÞ aÁb holds, we can randomize the points P and Q by selecting random values for a and b. Although this results in an additional factor of a Á b in the exponent of the result, we can eliminate this by careful selection of a and b such that a Á b ¼ 1 ðmod lÞ. Note that, for the modified Tate pairing on supersingular curves, both P and Q are defined over IF q , so computing b Á Q has the same cost as computing a Á P .
If one cannot accept the cost of a GCD-like operation to compute arbitrary random a and b pairs of the right form, it is possible to employ a deterministic update procedure akin to traditional point blinding. One computes and stores two random pairs such that which only costs two field multiplications per update and retains the fact that a Á b ¼ 1 mod l. In summary, the defense costs two additional point multiplications and two field multiplications to instrument.
Altering Traditional Point Blinding
Traditional point blinding for ECC has the host device store two extra points that are retained across invocations of the point multiplication algorithm. Given a secret multiplier d, the card stores a random point R and the point S ¼ d Á R. The point multiplication d Á P is then computed as d Á P ¼ d Á ðP þ RÞ À S so that the point fed into the multiplication routine is randomly blinded by first adding R with the result recovered by subtracting S. Considering the relationship eðP ; Q þ RÞ ¼ eðP ; QÞ Á eðP ; RÞ;
we can apply an augmented point blinding technique to the pairing so that the controlled point is again randomized before use. For the DPA-like attack described above, this seems to be a sufficient defense since, by randomizing the control point, the attack can no longer correctly compute the multiplication oracle that drives DPA selection. Assuming P is the secret point, Q is the point controlled by the attacker that we want to randomize, R is a random point, and S ¼ eðP ; RÞ À1 , we apply the map as eðP ; QÞ ¼ eðP ; Q þ RÞ Á S:
By blinding Q, the point under the control of the attacker, we effectively remove this control and, hence, defeat any attack based on it: The attacker can no longer reason about internal operation based on the point he sent into the pairing. Since P and R are known to the device at initialization, we can store the point R and field element S in order to implement the method. Using this technique, the overhead in performance is equal to one point addition and a field multiplication in G 3 . However, the issue of updating the blinding variables presents a drawback. Updating R and S is performed before or after the multiplication routine is executed in order to provide changing and hopefully nondeterministic blinding factors to the real point. In the traditional blinding defense, one might select a random b 2 fÀ2; þ2g and then set R b Á R and S b Á S. In our case, we need to replace the update of S with S S b . Squaring a field element is reasonably inexpensive, but, in order to accommodate both potential values of b, we need to store some extra information so that inversion is equally inexpensive. To do this, we can simply store and update the value S À1 along with S if there is enough space or use specialized representations of G 3 , which renders inversion inexpensive such as [11] in characteristic 3.
CONCLUSION
We have presented the first investigation into the security of pairing-based cryptography against side-channel attack. Although the use of pairings in the sorts of environment where side-channel attack is most prevalent is still some way off, the coupling of identity-based cryptography with identity-aware devices seems very attractive. Naive early assumptions about the security of pairings in this setting were as a result of directly applying existing knowledge of RSA and ECC vulnerabilities. However, since the use of pairings represents a vastly different and more diverse problem from that in more conventional systems, it is important to also consider new methods of attack. Our results show that, although vulnerabilities do inevitably exist, creative use of the bilinearity property of pairings and sensible implementation methods help to minimize such risk with low overhead.
Since the topic of pairings is fairly new, there is plenty of further work that could be done on fault attacks. Ciet and Joye [6] described two different fault attacks on ECC which work by computing point multiplications with invalid points and erroneous field arithmetic. Clearly, these attacks still apply whenever point multiplications are computed in pairing-based systems. Generally, it seems an open problem to consider what happens in the context of pairings if the curve parameters are erroneous, the input points are not on the correct curve, or the field representation is fault. These concepts seem interesting but more difficult than the ECC case since, for example, feeding invalid points into the pairing generally causes it to become degenerate.
It also seems vital to address the security of the BKLS [4] method of pairing evaluation. We have only considered closed-form style algorithms here; BKLS relies on a more general approach which is much more similar to ECC point multiplication. Since the BKLS algorithm seems an attractive choice for implementing systems based on fields of large prime characteristic, perhaps using MNT curves [15] , addressing security against fault attack is an interesting open problem.
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